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Abstract
We discuss the question of if and how undecidability might be trans-
latable into physics, in particular with respect to prediction and de-
scription, as well as to complementarity games.
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1 Physics after the incompleteness theorems
There is incompleteness in mathematics [22, 62, 13, 9, 12, 50]. That means
that there does not exist any reasonable (consistent) finite formal system from
which all mathematical truth is derivable. There exists a “huge” number
[11] of mathematical assertions (e.g., the continuum hypothesis, the axiom
of choice) which are independent of any particular formal system. That is,
they as well as their negations are compatible with the formal system.
Can such formal incompleteness be translated into physics or the natural
sciences in general? Is there some question about the nature of things which is
provable unknowable for rational thought? Is it conceivable that the natural
phenomena, even if they occur deterministically, do not allow their complete
description?
Before discussing these questions further, we should first clarify the terms
we use. Under a physical phenomenon we shall understand an event, which
is (irreversibly) observed. A typical physical phenomenon consists of a click
in a particle detector: there can be a click or there can be no click. This
yes-no scheme is experimental physics in-a-nutshell (at least according to a
theoretician). From this type of elementary observation, all of our physical
evidence is accumulated.
Then there are physical theories. Physical theories purport to relate to the
physical phenomena. At face value, they consist of phenomena themselves:
as observers, we would not be able to know about theories if we would not
observe their representation or code. A typical code of, say, the theory of
electrodynamics, consists of the consecutive letters and symbols printed in a
book on electrodynamics. Their reading corresponds to an act of observation.
Why should anyone bother about phenomena versus theories? Because
their distinction and interrelation is crucial for an understanding of unde-
cidability. Go¨del, for instance, proved his incompleteness theorems as he
succeeded to properly code a (generic) theory about arithmetic within arith-
metic. (The Viennese Circle of positivists provided the basis for the coding
technique.)
At one point of the argument, we have to confront ourselves with the
question, “is there a physical correspondent to the notion of inconsistency;
that is, to a logical contradiction [27]?” Can a particle, for example, be here
and somewhere else (≡ not here) [1]? On the phenomenological level, the
answer is no. To put it pointedly: there is no such thing as an inconsistent
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phenomenon. In a yes-no experiment which can have two possible outcomes,
only one of these outcomes will actually be measured. In contradistinction,
a theoretical description might allow the consistent “existence” of mutually
exclusive states if it is indeterministic (probabilistic). We shall come back to
these issues later.
Undecidability occurs in indeterministic as well as in mechanistic sys-
tems. The term indeterminism here stands for any process which cannot be
described finitely and causally. As a metaphor, we may say that in indeter-
ministic physical systems, “God plays dice.” By definition, indeterminism
implies undecidability. If there is no cause, there cannot be any predictable
effect. That is the whole story. Period.
Let us be more specific and consider two examples: Firstly, in quantum
mechanics, the prevalent probabilistic interpretation of the wave function pre-
tends that it is a complete description. Single outcomes cannot be determin-
istically accounted for. This is the quantum dice. Secondly, in the scenario
of “deterministic chaos,” the (Martin-Lo¨f/Solovay/Chaitin) randomness of
“almost all” initial values represented by elements of the classical mechani-
cal continuum is successively recovered during the time evolution—bit after
bit. Therefore, if one believes in the quantum dice and in the physical rele-
vance of the classical continuum, then, by definition, there is undecidability
in physics.
Why cannot we stop here, sit back and relax? We have just encountered
the fact that present-day physical theories contain indeterministic features
which evade any complete prediction. Why is this not the end of the story?
The trouble is that we shall never be sure that the probabilistic interpreta-
tion of the wave function is complete, nor do we know whether the classical
continuum is appropriate [21]. There might be a “secret arena” hidden to
us momentarily, in which everything can be deterministically accounted for.
If we relax now and uncritically accept indeterminism as a matter of un-
questionable fact, we may be heading for trouble. Indeterminism, as it is
conceived by the physics community at the fin de sie´cle (mille´naire), might
be a degenerative research program.
Therefore, it seems not inappropriate to try to re-interpret physical inde-
terminism constructively. In doing so, it is necessary to study undecidability
and incompleteness in systems which are mechanistic in more detail. By
mechanistic we mean that they are finitely describable and causal in all of
their aspects. (In what follows, the terms mechanistic, computable and re-
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cursive are synonyms.) In mechanistic systems, every effect has a cause.
But, one may doubt, if everything has a cause, how does one reconstruct in-
completeness? The most important thing to understand at this point is that,
although in principle every effect may have a cause, such causes might not be
knowable by intrinsic observers. We are introducing an inside-outside distinc-
tion here. Intrinsic observers are embedded in the system they observe—their
“Cartesian prison” [6, 61, 48, 49, 55, 56, 57, 58]. They cannot step outside.
The way it was defined, a mechanistic physical (dynamical) system cor-
responds one-to-one to a process of computation. This computation can,
for instance be implemented on a universal Cellular Automaton, a univer-
sal Turing machine or any other universal computer. It, in turn, corresponds
one-to-one to a formal system of logic. With these two identifications, namely
mechanistic dynamical system ≡ computation ≡ formal system, we bridge the
gap to formal undecidability. In principle, the term system could stand for
any of these three entities [58, 46].
We should be quite clearly aware of the fact that there is no other possible
formalization of undecidability besides recursive function theory and formal
logic. If one resents the idea of logical or of computer science terminology
creeping into physics, then there is no room for this issues. Undecidability
in physics marks the integration of yet another abstract science—recursion
theory—into physics.
We have set the stage now. Let us recapitulate: we would like to con-
sider mechanistic physical systems. Intrinsic observers are embedded therein.
These intrinsic observers register physical phenomena which are operational.
Moreover, they develop theories which are intrinsically codable. Our aim is to
figure out whether or not, under these constraints, certain physical phenom-
ena and theoretical propositions become undecidable. In doing so, we have
to translate the pandemonium of recursion theoretical undecidability into
physics. Our translation guide will be the equivalence between mechanistic
physical systems, computations and formal systems.
2 Prediction and description
Go¨del himself did not believe in any physical relevance of the incompleteness
theorems, in particular not for quantum mechanics [4]. He might have been
brainwashed by Einstein, who was bitterly opposed to the Copenhagen inter-
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pretation of quantum mechanics. Einstein thought that quantum mechanics
and the Copenhagen interpretation thereof, was a degenerative research pro-
gram [65, 28]. Einstein’s dictum “God does not play dice” has become a
legend.
And yet, there is a straightforward extension of formal incompleteness to
physics. It is based on Turing’s proof that certain propositions about uni-
versal computers—basically modeled to mimic elementary mechanical paper-
and-pencil operations on a sheet of paper—are undecidable. In particular,
it is impossible to predict whether or not a particular computation task on
universal computers will eventually terminate (and will output a particular
result). Therefore, if we construct a physical device capable of universal com-
putation, there are some propositions about the future of this system which
are provable undecidable.
Let us be more specific and (algorithmically) prove the statement above.
It is often referred to as the “halting theorem” or the “recursive undecid-
ability of the halting problem.” We are using a technique of diagonalization,
which was pioneered by Cantor in a proof of the undenumerability of the
reals. The technique is the most useful tool in exploring the undecidable.
The strategy of diagonalization (and related techniques) is to assume a
statement—whose existence should be disproved—and, by trivial manipula-
tions, derive a paradox, a contradiction. The only possibility to avoid this
paradox is to abandon the original statement. For the purpose of a formal
proof, any paradox can in principle be exploited, as long as it is codable into
formal entities. Go¨del [22] as well as Turing [62] used “the liar” [5] for their
incompleteness theorems. Go¨del was well aware of the fact that almost any
classical paradox might do as well. (Readers not interested in the details of
the proof may skip the entire next section.)
We shall prove the recursive unsolvability of the halting problem. As-
sume, for the moment, that there is an mechanistic way to foresee a partic-
ular aspect of the future of an arbitrary computation. Namely, whether or
not the computation will terminate. Or, if it outputs a string of symbols
and then terminates. Consider an arbitrary algorithm B(x) whose input is a
string of symbols x. Assume that there exists a “predictor” PREDICT which
is able to decide whether B terminates on x or not. Using the predictor
PREDICT(B(x)), we shall construct another computing agent A, which has as
input any effective program B and which proceeds as follows: Upon reading
the program B as input, A makes a copy of it. This can be readily achieved,
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since the program B is presented to A in some encoded form, i.e., as a string
of symbols. In the next step, the agent uses the code of B as input string
for B itself; i.e., A forms B(B). The agent now hands B(B) over to the pre-
diction subroutine PREDICT. Then, A proceeds as follows: if PREDICT(B(B))
decides that B(B) halts, then agent A does not halt; this can for instance
be realized by an infinite DO-loop; if PREDICT(B(B)) decides that B(B) does
not halt, then A halts. (This is the diagonalization step.) We shall now
confront the agent A with a paradoxical task by choosing A’s own code as
input for itself. Notice that B is arbitrary and has not been specified yet.
The deterministic agent A is representable by an algorithm with code of A.
Therefore, it is possible to substitute A for B. Assume that classically A
is restricted to classical bits of information. Then, whenever A(A) halts,
PREDICT(A(A)) forces A(A) not to halt. Conversely, whenever A(A) does
not halt, then PREDICT(A(A)) steers A(A) into the halting mode. In both
cases one arrives at a complete contradiction. Classically, this contradiction
can only be consistently avoided by assuming the nonexistence of A and,
since the only nontrivial feature of A is the use of the predictor subroutine
PREDICT, the impossibility of any such universal predictor.
Popper [42] considered these issues already in the forties. More sophis-
ticated models have been put forward by Wolfram [66], Moore [34] and da
Costa and Doria [17]. These approaches essentially embed a universal com-
puter (or equivalent systems of Diophantine equations) into a classical phys-
ical structure such as a field. The system is assumed to be infinite to allow
for infinite tape or its equivalent. Then undecidability follows, for instance,
from the recursive unsolvability of the halting problem.
In short: reasonable (consistent) theories predicting the future behavior
of arbitrary mechanistic physical systems are impossible. So, if one beliefs in
the physical relevance of the model of universal computers, then no physical
theory can predict all the physical phenomenology. In particular, there are
certain physical prediction tasks which are undecidable.
But what if one insists that any computation should remain finite? Then,
in principle, it would be possible to construct a predictor, which would just
have to simulate the system long and fast enough to complete the prediction.
Could such a prediction take a sufficiently short time in order to be useful?
And what if a finite predictor tries to predict itself? These questions get
us into quantitative issues, which are more involved. We shall attack them
next.
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The busy beaver function [45, 14] addresses the following question: given
a system whose size of description is finite; more precisely; less than or equal
to n bits long. What is the biggest number Σ(n) which can in principle be
produced by such a system before halting (or, alternatively, before recurring
to the system’s original state)?
A related question is: what is the upper bound of running time (or, alter-
natively, recurrence time) of a program of length n bits before terminating?
An answer to that question gives us a feeling of how long we have to wait for
the most time-consuming program of length n bits to hold. That, of course,
is a worst-case scenario. Many programs of length n bits will have halted be-
fore the maximal halting time. Let us denote it by TMAX. We could figure out
that knowledge of TMAX “solves” the halting problem quantitatively. Because
if we knew that maximal halting time, then for an arbitrary program of n
bits, we would have to wait just a little bit longer than TMAX(n). If it would
still run, then we could be sure that it would run forever. Otherwise it would
have halted. In this sense, knowledge of TMAX is equivalent to possessing a
perfect predictor PREDICT. Since the latter one does not exist, we expect
that TMAX cannot be constructive function easy to work with.
Indeed, Chaitin has proven [45, 14, 15, 19, 7] that TMAX(n) = Σ(n+O(1))
is the minimum time at which all programs of size smaller than or equal to n
bits which halt have done so. For large values of n, Σ(n) grows faster than any
computable function of n; more precisely, let f be an arbitrary computable
function, then there exists a positive integer k such that Σ(n) > f(n) for all
n > k.
You can virtually see that any system trying to evaluate the busy beaver
function “blows itself up.” Originally, T. Rado [45] asked how many 1’s a
Turing machine with n possible states and an empty input tape could print
on that tape before halting. The first values of the Turing busy beaver
ΣT (x) are finite and are known [19, 7]: ΣT (1) = 1, ΣT (2) = 4, ΣT (3) = 6,
ΣT (4) = 13, ΣT (5) ≥ 1915, ΣT (7) ≥ 22961, ΣT (8) ≥ 3 · (7 · 3
92 − 1)/2.
What does all this mean for physics? For mechanistic systems describable
by n bits, the recurrence time grows faster than any computable number of
n. It is therefore uncomputable and thus impossible to predict.
Any causal prediction requires a theory of the system which one wants to
predict. In the intrinsic observer scenario described above, there is no way
to cut out or separare the observer from the system. We have to deal with
self-description.
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Can observers embedded in a system ever hope for a complete theory or
self-description? Let us rephrase the question. Is it possible for a system
to contain a “blueprint,” a complete representation, of itself? This issue
has been raised by von Neumann in his investigation of self-reproducing
automata. With such a “blueprint” it can be shown that the automaton can
reconstruct a perfect replica of itself [63, 47, 37].
To avoid confusion, it should be noted that it is never possible to have
a finite description with itself as proper part. The trick is to employ repre-
sentations or names of objects, whose code can be smaller than the objects
themselves and can indeed be contained in that object (cf. [37], p. 165).
Go¨del’s first incompleteness theorem is such an example. Any book of elec-
tromagnetism is another.
A completely different issue is how such a theoretical self-description can
be obtained. Here, we have to make a distinction. A complete theory or
self-description might be obtained passively from some “intuition,” “God”
or “oracle.” (Of course, one could never be sure that it is the right one.)
But it is generally impossible for an intrinsic observer to actively examine
the own system and thereby to construct a complete theory. One reason is
self-interference and complementarity, as described below.
As a comfort to those who conceive the “Cartesian prison” as the source
of all problems, one could cite a nice theorem by Gold [24]. It is sometimes
referred to as the recursive undecidability of the rule inference problem: For
any mechanistic intelligence/agent A, there exists a total recursive function f
such that A does not infer f . In more physical terms, there is no systematic
way of finding a deterministic law from the (input/)output analysis of a
mechanistic physical system.
An informal way to (algorithmically) prove Gold’s theorem uses the halt-
ing theorem. Suppose that it would indeed be possible to derive laws system-
atically. Let us call this agent or computable function RULE. RULE would have
to watch the behavior of the system it analyzes. But, any complete analysis
would require the observation of TMAX(n), where n is the minimal description
size of the system. Since TMAX(n) grows faster than any computable function
of n, RULE cannot be computable.
So even if the observer would be in a “God-like” position and would be
disentangled and freed from the observed system, he would still have to cope
with the situation that there is no systematic way of deriving causal laws. It
remains a rare art.
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Of what use is a complete theory? Is it possible for an observer in a finite
amount of time to predict the own state completely?
An intuitive understanding of the impossibility of complete self-comprehension
can be obtained by considering a variant of Zeno’s paradox of Achilles and
the Tortoise/Hector (called “paradox of Tristram Shandy” by Popper Pop-
per [42]): In order to predict oneself completely, one has to predict oneself
predicting oneself completely, one has to predict oneself predicting oneself
predicting oneself completely, one has to . . .”
3 Complementarity Games
The Hinduistic notion of Maya suggests that the world of senses is illusory,
that observations are distractive. Plato’s cage metaphor emphasizes the dis-
tinction between objects and what we may be able to observe from these
objects. Some day, complementarity might be perceived as a variation of
this ancient theme.
There has been hardly any feature of quantum mechanics which has given
rise to as many fruitless speculations as complementarity. Intuitively, com-
plementarity states that it is impossible to (irreversibly) observe certain ob-
servables simultaneously with arbitrary accuracy. The more precisely one of
these observables is measured, the less precisely can be the measurement of
other—complementary—observables. Typical examples of complementary
observables are position/momentum (velocity), angular momentum in the
x/y/z direction, and particle number/phase [39, 65].
The intuition (if intuition makes any sense in the quantum domain) be-
hind this feature is that the act of (irreversible) observation of a physical
system causes a loss of information by (irreversibly) interfering with the
system. Thereby, the possibility to measure other aspects of the system is
destroyed.
Well, this is not the whole story. Indeed, there is reason to believe that—
at least up to a certain magnitude of complexity—any measurement can
be “undone” by a proper reconstruction of the wave-function. A necessary
condition for this to happen is that all information about the original mea-
surement is lost. Schro¨dinger, the creator of wave mechanics, liked to think
of the wave function as a sort of prediction catalog [52]. This prediction cat-
alogue contains all potential information. Yet, it can be opened only at one
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particular page. The prediction catalog may be closed before this page is
read. Then it could be opened once more at another, complementary, page.
By no way it is possible to open the prediction catalog at one page, read and
(irreversibly) memorize (measure) the page, close it; then open it at another,
complementary, page. (Two non-complementary pages which correspond to
two co-measurable observables can be read simultaneously.)
This may sound a little bit like Wodoo. It is tempting to speculate that
complementarity can never be modeled by classical metaphors. Yet, classical
examples abound. A trivial one is a dark room with a ball moving in it.
Suppose that we want to measure its position and its velocity. We first try
to measure the ball’s position by touch it. This finite contact inevitably
causes a finite change of the ball’s motion. Therefore, we cannot any longer
measure the initial velocity of the ball with arbitrary position.
There are a number of more faithful classical metaphors for quantum
complementarity. Take, for instance, Cohen’s “firefly-in-a-box” model [16],
Wright’s urn model [67], as well as Aerts’ vessel model [2]. In what follows,
we are going to explore a model of complementarity pioneered by Moore
[35]. It is based on extremely simple systems—probably the simplest systems
you can think of—on finite automata. The finite automata we will consider
here are objects which have a finite number of internal states and a finite
number of input and output symbols. Their time evolution is mechanistic
and can be written down on tables in matrix form. There are no build-in
infinities anywhere; no infinite tape or memory, no non-recursive bounds on
the runtime et cetera.
Let us develop computational complementarity, as it is often called [20],
as a game between you as the reader and me as the author. The rules of the
game are as follows. I first give you all you need to know about the intrinsic
workings of the automaton. For example, I tell you, “if the automaton is
in state 1 and you input the symbol 2, then the automaton will make a
transition into state 2 and output the symbol 0;” and so on. Then I present
you a black box which contains a realization of the automaton. The black
box has a keyboard, with which you input the input symbols. It has an
output display, on which the output symbols appear. No other interfaces are
allowed. Suppose that I can choose in which initial state the automaton is
at the beginning of the game. I do not tell you this state. Your goal is to
find out by experiment which state I have chosen. You can simply guess or
relying on your luck by throwing a dice. But you can also perform clever
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input-output experiments and analyze your data in order to find out. You
win if you give the correct answer. I win if you guess incorrectly. (So, I have
to be mean and select worst-case examples).
Suppose that you try very hard. Is cleverness sufficient? Will you always
be able to uniquely determine the initial automaton state?
The answer to that question is “no.” The reason for this is that there
may be situations when the input causes an irreversible transition into a
state which does not allow any further queries about the initial state. This is
the meaning of the term “self-interference” mentioned above. Any such irre-
versible loss of information about the initial value of the automaton can be
traced back to many-to-one operations [31]: different states are mapped onto
a single state with the same output. Many-to-one operations such as “dele-
tion of information” are the only source of entropy increase in mechanistic
systems [31, 3].
In the automaton case discussed above, one could, of course, restore re-
versibility and recover the automaton’s initial state by Landauer’s “Ha¨nsel
und Gretel”-strategy. That is, one could introduce an additional marker at
every many-to-one node which indicates the previous state before the tran-
sition. But then, as the combined automaton/marker system is reversible,
going back to the initial state erases all previous knowledge. This is analogous
to the re-opening of pages of Schro¨dinger’s prediction catalog.
Well, this might be a good moment for introducing a sufficiently simple
example. Consider, therefore, an automaton which can be in one of three
states, denoted by 1, 2 and 3. This automaton accepts three input symbols,
namely 1, 2 and 3. It outputs only two symbols, namely 0 and 1. The
transition function of the automaton is as follows: on input 1, it makes a
transition to (or remains in) state 1; on input 2, it makes a transition to (or
remains in) state 2; on input 3, it makes a transition to (or remains in) state
3. This is a typical irreversible many-to-one operation, since a particular
input steers the automaton into that state, no matter in which one of the
three possible state it was previously. The output function is also many-
to-one and rather simple: whenever both state and input coincide—that is,
whenever the guess was correct—it outputs 1; else it outputs 0. So, for
example, if it was in state 2 or 3 and receives input 1, it outputs 0 and makes
a transition to state 1. There it awaits another input. These automaton
specifications can be conveniently represented by diagrams such as the one
drawn in Fig. 1(a).
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Figure 1: (a) transition diagram of a quantum-like finite automaton featur-
ing computational complementarity. Input and output symbols are separated
by a comma. Arrows indicate transitions. (b) Hasse diagram of its proposi-
tional structure. Lower elements imply higher ones if they are connected by
edge(s).
12
Computational complementarity manifests itself in the following way: if
one does not know the automaton’s initial state, one has to make choices
between the input of symbols 1,2, or 3; corresponding to definite answers
whether the automaton was in state 1, 2 or 3, corresponding to output 1;
and (2 or 3), (1 or 3) or (2 or 3), corresponding to output 0, respectively. In
the latter case, i.e., whenever the automaton responds with a 0 (for failure),
one has lost information about the automaton’s initial state, since it surely
has made a transition into the state 1,2 or 3. The following propositions
can be stated. On input 1, one obtains information that the automaton
either was in state 1 (exclusive) or not in state 1, that is, in state 2 or 3.
This is denoted by v(1) = {{1}, {2, 3}}. On input 2, we obtain informa-
tion that the automaton either was in state 1 (exclusive) or in state 1 or 3,
denoted by v(2) = {{2}, {1, 3}}. On input 3, we obtain information that
the automaton either was in state 1 (exclusive) or in state 1 or 2, denoted
by v(3) = {{3}, {1, 2}}. In that way, we naturally arrive at the notion of a
partitioning of automaton states according to the information obtained from
input/output experiments. Every element of the partition stands for the
proposition that the automaton is in (one of) the state(s) contained in that
partition.
From any partition we can construct the Boolean propositional calculus
which is obtained if we identify its atoms with the elements of the partition.
We then “paste” all Boolean propositional calculi (sometimes called subal-
gebras or blocks) together. This is a standard construction in the theory of
orthomodular posets [29, 44, 40, 36]. In the above example, we arrive at a
form of non-Boolean lattice whose Hasse diagram MO3 is of the “Chinese
latern” type drawn in Fig. 1(b).
Let us go still a little bit further and ask which automaton games of the
above kind can people play. This requires the systematic investigation of
all possible non-isomorphic automaton propositional structures, or, equiv-
alently, partition logics [58, 51, 60]. In Fig. 2, the Hasse diagrams of all
nonisomorphic four-state automaton propositional calculi are drawn.
Recall that the method introduced here is not directly related to diagonal-
ization and is a second, independent source of undecidability. It is already
realizable at an elementary pre-diagonalization level, i.e., without the re-
quirement of computational universality or its arithmetic equivalent. The
corresponding machine model is the class of finite automata.
Since any finite state automaton can be simulated by a universal com-
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Figure 2: Variations of the complementarity game up to four automaton
states.
puter, complementarity is a feature of sufficiently complex deterministic uni-
verses as well. To put it pointedly: if the physical universe is conceived as the
product of a universal computation, then complementarity is an inevitable
and necessary feature of the perception of intrinsic observers. It cannot be
avoided.
Conversely, any computation can be realized by a sufficiently complex
finite automaton. Therefore, the class of all complementary games is a unique
on, encompassing all possible deterministic universes.
What has all this to do with intrinsic observers? Well, during the game
one is not allowed to “screw open” the black box. Equivalently, one is not
allowed to make identical copies of the black box. Both, the “screwing open”
operation as well as copying, would represent actions which should only be
accessible to “God-like,” external observers, but not to intrinsic ones living
in their “Cartesian prison.” This is similar to quantum mechanics. Copying
of quantum information (unless purely classical) or other one-to-many oper-
ations are impossible. One cannot, for instance, produce two identical copies
of an electron or of a photon [26].
The complementarity game described above shows strong similarities to
quantum mechanical systems (in two-dimensional Hilbert space). Indeed, if
we could let the black box “shrink” down to point size, we would obtain an
analogue of an electron or photon, at least for spin or polarization measure-
ments in three different directions. Suppose we want to measure the spin
direction of an electron at some angle ϕ. We can do this by a Stern-Gerlach
device oriented in that particular direction. According to the probabilis-
tic interpretation of the wave function, this measurement “randomizes” (i.e.,
makes impossible any measurements of the original) spin components in other
directions. That is, we loose information about the electron’s “original” spin
(if it is legitimate to state that it ever had one [65, 38]) along the direc-
tions ϕ′ 6= ϕ. Indeed, the propositional structure of three spin measurements
along three different angles is identical to the one drawn in Fig. 1(b). Nev-
ertheless, there is a difference between the “true” quantum particle and its
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black box-cousin: whereas the former one is supposed to have physical spin
or polarization in a continuity of directions, the latter one can only be gener-
alized to an arbitrary countable number of directions. From a practical point
of view, such differences cannot be observed and are therefore operationally
irrelevant [8, 59].
Even to high-ranking specialists, quantum mechanical effects appear mind-
boggling [25]. Amazingly enough, the complementarity game based on au-
tomata beats quantum mechanics by weirder peculiarities. Take, as an exam-
ple, the complementarity game with the automaton drawn in Fig. 3(a). Input
of the sequence of two symbols 00 decides between the automaton states 1
and 2 and 3 or 4. The resulting partition is v(00) = {{1}, {2}, {3, 4}}. In-
put of the sequence of two symbols 10 decides between the automaton states
1 or 2 and 3 and 4. The resulting partition is v(10) = {{1, 2}, {3}, {4}}.
By pasting these two blocks together, we obtain a propositional structure
represented in Fig. 3(b).
This complementarity game has several peculiar features. It is no lattice
because the supremum and infimum is not uniquely definable. The “impli-
cation” is not transitive either, because 1 → 1 ∨ 2 requires input 00 and
1∨ 2→ 1∨ 2∨ 3 requires input 10, whereas 1→ 1∨ 2∨ 3 cannot be realized
by any experiment.
It would be nice if some day the experimenters would find physical systems
which behave in that way. Then, of course, we would have to abandon
quantum mechanics and learn some theory of the complementarity game.
4 Should physicists really bother with unde-
cidability?
The program to study relative limits of knowledge can be attacked from to
opposite extreme positions. On the one hand, it may be objected that there
are no principally unknowables, because everything is strictly causal. On the
other hand it may be stated that undecidability in physics is a trivial matter
of fact and must be accepted without any further efforts.
The first, rationalistic, position is based on the Cartesian assumption that
the world is conceivable by (human) rational thought. Laplace’s demon [32]
is a metaphor for this attitude. Indeed, to many physicists, undecidability
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(a)
✉ ✉
✉ ✉
✲
✻
✛
❄
1
23
4
1,0
0,0
0,1
0,0
1,1
1,0
1,0
0,0
✖✕
✗✔
✖✕
✗✔
✠
✗
(b)
✉✉ ✉ ✉
✉✉ ✉ ✉
✉
✉
✉✉
∅
{1, 2, 3, 4}
{1} {2} {3} {4}
{3, 4}{1, 2}
{1, 2, 3}
{1, 2, 4} {1, 3, 4}
{2, 3, 4}
Figure 3: (a) complementarity game featuring weirder-than quantum prop-
erties; (b) Hasse diagram of its propositional structure.
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and unpredictability are everyday phenomena. They encounter a problem
which they cannot solve or ask questions they cannot answer. Yet, they
would hardly conceive this experience as an indication that there is something
out there which is profoundly undecidable. It might not be unfair to state
that—with the remarkable exceptions of chaos and quantum theory—most
physicists perceive undecidable statements not as fundamentally unknowable
but as a challenge and a possibility for future knowledge.
Quite similarly, mathematicians often perceive Go¨del’s incompleteness
theorems as artifacts. To them, Go¨delian sentences appear curious, even
dubious, and explicitly constructed for their purpose. Despite proofs that
“almost all” true theorems are undecidable [11], they feel that all “real”
mathematical problems they bother with are solvable.
In this century, the second, irrational approach, has most influentially
been publicized—despite many reluctances from leading quantum pioneers
[28, 65]—by the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics. Chaos
theory, as it is often called, has given irrationality a further kick. Already in
1889, Poincare´ suggested that certain n-body problems may turn out to be
impossible to solve [41]. Even today, after the development of recursive (com-
putable) function theory, many issues remain unsettled. Certain assumptions
and problems yield the nonpreservation of computability in classical analy-
sis [53, 64, 30, 54, 43, 10]. The necessity and the physical relevance of the
classical continuum is at least debatable [59].
We propose here to pursue a third path. This third path is characterized
by a formal investigation of the descriptive limits of theories, as well as of
predictability in general. It may well be that this is a further, necessary step
we have to go in our understanding of Nature.
At the end, let us come back to the question posed before, “undecidabil-
ity everywere?” It may well be that yes, there is undecidability everywhere,
and that we are confronted with it very often. We just may not have identi-
fied undecidability correctly, as some emerging feature of (self-) description
(with-) in a mechanistic universe. Depending on our philosophical assump-
tions, some of us may like to think that the everday unknowns are either
manifestations of some basic randomness, a sort of “chaos” underlying na-
ture; or, on the contrary, that they are simply an artifact of our limited
knowledge and power to implement that knowledge. We may find out that
there is yet a third possibility, having to do with with the fact that, informally
stated, self-knowledge is necessarily incomplete.
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